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Abstract 
Umuganda, the ritual of communal labor practiced in Rwanda since pre-colonial 
kingdoms, has a long and varied history of implementation. Once an integral part of the 
patron-client relationship, umuganda originated as the exchange of cattle for feudal 
protection; currently, it is a system of mandatory labor being utilized for post-genocide 
political and economic development. Umuganda has been championed by both past and 
present presidential administrations as the foundational centerpiece of progress, yet it also 
served as an instrumental tool in mass participation during the genocide. This paper will 
focus on the historical roots and transformation of umuganda in order to deconstruct its 
current use as encouraging economic and political development. 
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Introduction 
The historical process will dictate that umuganda has a bleak and destructive 
discourse deeply imbedded in the peasantry and agricultural economic system of 
Rwanda. However, the general consensus among current policy makers and international 
donor organizations sees umuganda as the essence of rebuilding the country's economy, 
nationalism, and spirit. Forced manual labor under ubureetwa was one of the strongest 
dividing factors of Hutu and Tutsi in colonial Rwanda, and yet um uganda ,  a 
"communal," though mandatory, manual labor system is considered instrumental in 
building inclusion and developing nationalism in post-genocide Rwanda. How can 
umuganda, fresh in collective memory as a method that drove people to commit acts of 
genocide, be incorporated to promote prosperity and rebuild trust? 
There are various linguistic interpretations of the word umuganda. Traditionally, 
it is considered to be a translation of "contribution" and "cooperative communal labor." 
Rwandan linguist Dr. Eugene Shimamungu (2005) gives a historically detailed definition 
of umuganda as "a piece of wood that is driven into the ground in order to serve as pillars 
for a house . . .  When neighbors were building, each person would bring a piece of timber 
to assist in building and in that mutual self-help context the term 'umuganda' means 
community self-help." 
However, the definition of umuganda reflects its political and economic utility 
over time. For example, as Verwimp (2000) confirms umuganda is a "Kinyarwanda 
word for the wood used to construct a house . .. ," he proceeds to qualify that it " .. . was 
one of Habyarimana's favorite speech topics and one of the regime's most influential 
policies" (p. 344). During the genocide, radio stations would use umuganda 
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euphemistically to call people to collective action through "a thinly veiled code referring 
to 'work' instead of killing" (Li, 2004, p. 12). Whereas, the contemporary Rwandan 
government administration states that umuganda translates to "We work together" 
(Agbor, 2011 ). It is clear the historical roots of umuganda demonstrate a call to collective 
action, yet it is the context of this action that varies based on societal and political needs. 
Scholarship on the Rwandan genocide has predominantly focused on causation, 
particularly on the ethnic development and distinction of Hutu and Tutsi, in addition to 
the gradual distrust between these groups as rooted in the pre-colonial and colonial state 
(Des Forges, 1972; Lemarchand, 1970, 1994, 1995; C. Newbury, 1989, 1995; D. 
Newbury, 1994). Jefremovas (1997) has cited this debate to be one of a "meta-conflict," 
or "a conflict about the nature of conflict" (p. 92). Whereas, revisionist scholarship has 
marked Hutu and Tutsi as economic distinctions (Mamdani, 2001 ), these various 
interpretations of history center on "the shaping of ethnic antagonisms" and "what it 
means to be Rwandan" (Jefremovas, 1997, 93). The research gives a thorough 
examination of the animosities that were cultivated; however, it focuses minutely on 
socioeconomic status and, furthermore, how this status explains mass participation in the 
genocide. Mamdani (2001) outlines the academic investigation into this phenomenon as 
two predominant discourses: "one focuses on society, the other on the state" (p. 199). 
In fact, the causation debate highlights the distinctions between the political 
situations surrounding the genocide in Rwanda and those that influenced the mass 
killings and genocide in neighboring Burundi in 1972 and the early-mid 1990s. As 
Lemarchand (1994) notes: 
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It is important to stress that Rwanda and Burundi cannot be understood 
independently of each other. Historically, and to this day, ethnic strife in 
the former has had a profound impact on the destinies of the latter, and 
vice versa. Just as the Hutu-led revolution in Rwanda has contributed 
directly to the sharpening of ethnic polarities in Burundi, so the 
assassination of that state's first popularly elected President, Melchior 
Ndadaye (a Hutu), at the hands of the all-Tutsi army, on 21 October 1993, 
provides the indispensable backdrop for an understanding to the Rwanda 
genocide. (p. 585) 
6 
The historiography of these two nations has traditionally treated the cultural distinction of 
Hutu and Tutsi as "fixed," while considering political actors and governmental systems 
as evolutionary (Newbury, 2001, pp. 258-59). In fact, political structures of Rwanda and 
Burundi are not detached from social distinctions of Hutu and Tutsi, rather they 
underscore the differences in government structure as independence ushered in a Hutu­
dominated republic in Rwanda and a constitutional monarchy in Burundi (Lemarchand, 
1994, p. 581). 
Therefore, as the historiography dictates, if ethnic motivations cannot be entirely 
legitimized, how does history account for mass participation in the genocide? A popular, 
and easy, answer is to assume all Rwandans are socially predisposed to obedience 
(Prunier, 1995, p. 141-142). This is not entirely as problematic or simplistic as it sounds 
considering the majority of the Rwandan citizenry was uneducated and had a long 
tradition of living under authoritarian control. Yet, this obedience to authority can be 
further analyzed through an examination of umuganda. Rather than focus on ethnic 
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identity and obedience as the motivational source of conflict, mass participation can be 
accounted for through the use and stimulus of umuganda, collective action that all 
Rwandans were historically familiar with. 
The study of umuganda brings the focus on the peasantry, whereas the traditional 
concentration has been on the roles of the state and leadership elite. Rural society is an 
integral, arguably the most important, component in Rwandan development. Though the 
term "peasant" is problematic in Rwanda1, it is precisely this large portion of the 
population that serves as an economic and political necessity in building a sustainable 
state immersed in the world market. In an entirely agriculturally-based economic system, 
the peasants are the foundation for future development. 
President Juvenal Habyarimana understood this, as does current President Paul 
Kagame. Peasant ideology is "rural romanticism," and control of the population is one 
that leadership elites continue to seek and maintain. Yet, the subaltern model receives 
little attention in deconstructing the historical context of the genocide, as Newbury & 
Newbury (2000) note: 
The dominant v1s10n of Rwanda's history emphasized political 
homogeneity, ethnic distinctions, and the power of the state. In so doing, 
it sublimated alternative visions, which expressed regional particularity, 
diverse forms of identity (based on kin, class, occupation, and friendship 
networks), and the interaction oflocal agency with elite policy. (p. 833) 
1 Peasants are traditionally subsistence agriculturalists, though in Rwanda this is more closely associated 
with the label "Hutu" (Ryan, 20 1 0, p. 3). As the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' will be deconstructed in Chapter 
1 ,  the term 'peasant' will be used to denote any Rwandan citizen who comprises the 90% of the population 
that work as subsistence agriculturalists, of Hutu or Tutsi origin, with the consideration that these terms are 
now illegal in Rwanda. 
FROM THE GROUND UP 8 
In an economy based entirely on agriculture and a development model based 
entirely on the input and cooperation of the peasantry, it is worth examining the 
genocide through this same lens. The following is a historical examination of 
umuganda, how it was used to incite mass participation in the 1994 genocide, and its 
contemporary role in Rwandan economic and political development. 
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Pre-Colonial Systems of Labor 
The historical roots of um uganda are found by examining the ideological 
development of Rwanda's labor force. The socioeconomic structure of Rwandan society 
is obtusely triangular with roughly 90% of the population living in poor, rural areas. 
However, umuganda is structured as a top-down program, as the public works necessities 
are driven by the demands and needs of those in leadership positions (Verwimp, 2000, p. 
346). As the relationship between elite leaders and the civilian population is a reliable 
indicator of how society functions as a whole, the development of this relationship is 
essential in providing a context in which umuganda is currently being instituted. 
The rapidity and mass mobilization during the genocide is often attributed to an 
innate obedience on the part of the Rwandan people, often qualified by the use of the 
media, or more specifically, the radio. Yet, umuganda, a labor system that has been 
institutionalized in Rwanda history, plays an often overlooked and vital role. 
The Development of the King's Labor Force 
Rwanda is currently a country roughly the size of Switzerland, minute m 
comparison to the vast states that make up the majority of its neighbors. Prior to German 
exploration at the tum of the twentieth century, however, the Rwandan kingdom was 
considered to be one of the most powerful in the region. Rwanda's very name can be 
translated to "Great Expansion" (Kagame, 1972, p. 50), but the extent of power is a prime 
interpretational target for many African historians, primarily those concerned with the 
divisive development of Hutu and Tutsi as ethnicities. As David Newbury (1994) notes 
in his exhaustive study on the dynastic chronology of Rwanda, "while as independent 
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polities [are] assumed to be culturally autonomous, source material from one is often 
drawn on to fill in the gaps of others ... [this is] especially common where there were 
powerful kingdoms whose political boundaries were assumed to be rigid and inviolate" 
(p. 191 ). These scholarly assumptions are based on the records of oral tradition, and the 
exact determination of dates and regions where leaders were said to have governed can 
vary from historian to historian (see Table 1). Though the structure and lineage of the 
Rwandan monarchy can be traced to antiquity, for the purpose of this examination, the 
discussion will be confined to the relationship of the kings to their citizens immediately 
leading up to German exploration. 
Table 1 
Rwanda Royal Chronology per various authorities 
KaRam� Van.�ina Rrrutit :-.1mrilJJirnbur.a 
Ruganzu Bw1mba 1312-1345 1458-1482 1532-1559 1468-1470 
C)·ilima Rugwe 1345-1378 1482-1506 1559-1586 1470-1520 
K.igeri Mu kobanya 1378·141 I 1506-1528 I 586-1588 1520-1543 
Mibambwc Mu1abaz.i 1411-1444 I 528· 1552 15811-1593 154'.l-1566 
Yubi Galuma 1444-1477 1552-1576 1593-WJJ 1566-1589 
Ncfahiro Cyamna1are 1477-1510 1576-1600 16m 1589-1600 
Ruganz.u :'\don 1510-1541 l WO-I 624 1603-16:10 1(.00-1623 
Mutara Semugeslu 1543-1576 1624-1648 1610-1657 1621-1646 
K.Jgeri :-;yamuhc.�hera J 57<'>- l<i09 164 . j(,72 1<'>57-1<'> 4 1646-l('.('.9 
Mibambwc (i1sanura 1(-0<J-1642 1672-1(196 1684-1711 16<'>9-1692 
Yul11 Mazimpaka 1642-1675 l696-1720 1711-1738 1692-1715 
Karcmcra Rwaka 1720-1744 1n -1756 1715-1731 
Cyihrna Rujui;ira 1675-1708 1744-1768 1756-1765 IBl-1759 
Kigcn !l:dabarasa 17011-1741 176R-1792 1765-1792 1769-1792 
Mibambwe Senrabyo 1741-1746 1792-1797 1792-171)7 l 79"!.-1797 
Yuhi Gahindiw 1746- 1797-18�0 1797-1830 1791.11no 
Mulara R"·cgera · 1853 lR:l0-1 60 I :-10-IR60 1830-1860 
K.igeri Rwabugm I 1\51-1895 1860-1!195 I 860· l 895 IMO·IR95 
M1bambwc Ru1arindwa 1896 1895-1896 
Yuhi Mu�inga I 897-1931 1897-1931 1896-19:\1 
Mutara Rudahigwa 19'.\i-1959 19�1-1959 1931-1959 
Source: Newbury, 1994, p. 217 
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The Rwandan dynastic cycle centered around Imana, or the "dynamic principle of 
life and fertility" (Coupez & d'Hertefelt, 1964, p. 460). Rulers utilized this divine 
connection for the production of food and the prosperity of the people through traditional 
rites and rituals. The patron-client relationship evolved over time, as the state became 
more centralized. "The state of Rwanda emerged as did many a state in the region, 
through the amalgamation of several autonomous chiefships into a single nuclear 
kingdom, under the leadership of a royal clan" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 62). During the 14th 
and 15th centuries, the mwami had authority that more closely resembled that of a priest 
or shaman with little to no power over the population and even less over production. The 
main power seemed to rest in the lineage heads, who organized and distributed lands in 
return for fealty (usually in the form of food or beer) from the clients (Jefremovas, 1997, 
p. 93). 
It was not until the 16th century, as threats from bordering states increased, that 
the mwami's power was expanded to create a permanent military organization. "Power 
was based on the control of men, not the control of land" (Jefremovas, 1997, p. 94). This 
control of men contributed to the modem development of patron-client relations; the 
transmission of fealty transitioned from umuheto, the giving of cattle from the client to 
the patron in return for protection, to ubuhake, the patron's use of one of the client's cows 
(Des Forges, 1972, pp. 5-6; Mamdani, 2001, p. 65). The nature of the relationship 
between the king and his subjects shifted dramatically; whereas, once the ownership of 
the cattle had belonged to the client, the cattle were now for the mwami to take at his 
discretion. This shift is significant in understanding the dynamic between the leader and 
the extent of his control over his subjects. The relationship developed from reciprocal to 
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authoritarian and, eventually, this exhibition of despotic dominance and demand over the 
population contributed to ubureetwa, the indentured servitude of mainly the Hutu 
population during the 19th century. 
The practices of ubureetwa and umuganda are directly related. Whereas, 
ubureetwa required the peasants to work a certain number of days a week on the land, in 
relative serfdom, the enforcement of this manual labor system evolved with umuganda in 
the 20th century, a mandatory contribution to public works and infrastructure, including 
but not limited to, land cultivation and agriculture. 
The Economic Distinction between Hutu and Tutsi 
It is seemingly impossible to discuss any part of Rwandan history without 
acknowledging the development of the Tutsi and Hutu, both as economic groups and 
separate ethnicities. In fact, the majority of literature surrounding Rwanda concentrates 
mainly on these two groups2 and the historiography is seemingly divided. Early historians 
had two differing viewpoints regarding the power structure of pre-colonial Rwandan 
kingdoms: either the state was relatively hierarchical with a system of patronage3 or it 
was considered exploitative with a concentration on the ethnicity of Hutu-Tutsi. 
However, contemporary scholarship concentrates on the ever-changing nature of pre-
colonial history, primarily focusing on the development of ethnicity in Rwanda. Although 
it serves as an integral part of the region's history, the irony "is that ethnicity is hard to 
define in Rwanda, because people have the same culture, language, religion, share a 
2 The Twa, the third Rwandan social group, are often overlooked in discussions of ethnic development 
because they did not play a large role in the genocide and comprise less than I% of the population. 
3 The debate can be extended regarding the equity of the client-state relationship. 
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common history, live together and intermarry . . .  Ethnicity is a very malleable category" 
(Jefremovas, 1997, pp. 92-3). Ethnicity is considered by many to be the invention of 
colonists, using the designations of Tutsi and Hutu to describe an economic and 
agricultural status. Simply, the Tutsi were pastoralists, a minority of the population 
considered to center their modes of production around the use of cattle. The Hutus, 
comprising the majority of the population, were subsistence farmers and cultivators. This 
relationship evolved over time. Davidson (1992) states: 
The general nineteenth century move toward more emphatic forms of 
centralized power had developed the dominance of a minority group, the 
Tutsi, over a Hutu majority. But the manner of this nineteenth-century 
dominance was mild, and was regulated by 'lord and vassal' relationships, 
which had some resemblance to the simpler forms of European feudalism. 
(p. 249)4 
There is also an academic concentration on the exploitation of the Tutsi rulers against 
their Hutu majority.5 The notion of client-state relations, in which the Tutsi has dominant 
governing lineage and the Hutu are the subservient majority, is later reinforced and 
perpetuated by colonial administration. 
4 This explains how the Germans and Belgians saw the relationship, as Tutsi king to Hutu subject, with 
little regard for any regional or cultural variations. 
5 In fact, this historical (mis)perception was exploited and turned into a major catalyst for "Hutu Power" 
propaganda after independence and in leading to the 1994 genocide. 
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The modem conception of Hutu-Tutsi relations, clientship, and ethnicity can be 
attributed to the rule of mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri, who reigned from 1853/1860-1895 
(Newbury, 1994, p. 217).6 As Mamdani (2001) states: 
He further centralized the state structure, but through a series of reforms that 
had a contradictory outcome: at the same time as it expanded Hutu 
participation in the army from nonmilitary to fighting roles - and appointed 
Hutu to administrative positions while taking on the power of uppity Tutsi 
aristocratic lineages - these reforms debased the social position of the Hutu 
outside the army and administration and further polarized the social 
opposition between Hutu and Tutsi. (p. 69) 
Rwabugiri was responsible for solidifying the Hutu as the dependent peasant population 
and the Tutsis as the lineage heads of land and state. This is not to say that there were not 
Tutsi peasants, nor Hutu elite. In fact, the majority of the Tutsi were commoners and had 
more in common with their fellow peasants than with the ruling elite. It was the Hutus 
that had risen to elite status (kwihutura ), through marriage, fealty, or control· of land, who 
proved to have little in common with the masses that they exploited (Jefremovas, 1997, p. 
96). These Hutus could essentially shed their Hutu roots and acquire Tutsi status7 as the 
categories of Hutu and Tutsi evolved over time. "There was a great deal more individual 
mobility and interchange than any static model of some collective 'Rwandan past' can 
account for. .. region was more important than royalty in defining identity, and ecology 
more influential than ethnicity in molding people's lives" (Newbury & Newbury, 2000, 
6 Kagame believes that Rwabugiri began his kingship in 1 853, while other Rwandan historical authorities 
cite 1 860 as his first year of administration. Refer to Table l. 
7 Though simplified, this is one justification for viewing Tutsi and Hutu as political and/or economic status, 
rather than separate ethnicities. 
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p. 840). However, this qualifying factor in economic identity disappeared under colonial 
authority. 
The relationship of the king to the masses shifted as Rwabugiri centralized state 
and administrative control and solidified population divisions as European colonialism 
began. It is acknowledged that Rwabugiri was "good and generous to the people" 
(Pottier, 1986, p. 222) and even his granary was called rutsindamapfa, "conqueror of 
famine" (Smith, 1998, 744). However, there was also widespread resistance to the 
aggressive expansion of the Rwandan kingdom during his reign. 
The intensification of conflict between Tutsi and Hutu during this period 
was due rather to the multiplication of aristocratic lineages, their violent 
competition for power at the expense of the monarchy, the expansion of 
cattle herds, and the adoption of American crops fostering population 
growth, which created land scarcity and enabled aristocrats to exploit the 
peasantry more ruthlessly. (Iliffe, 2007, p. 190) 
It is not surprising that Rwabugiri is seen as the last legitimate Rwandan king, and it is 
his policies that the colonists would interpret as the establishment of Hutu and Tutsi class 
distinctions . German colonial authorities (assisted by anti-Tutsi uprising between two 
clans, the Abeega and the Abanyiginya) replaced Rwabugiri 's successor, Mibambwe 
Ruarindwa with Yuhi Musinga (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 70-1; Smith, 1998, pp. 744-5). In 
the face of their new king, Rwandans revolted. The illegitimacy of his rule was only 
compounded by the need of Germany authority and arms to suppress these uprisings . 
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Under Colonial Authority, 1895-1962 
The Industrial Revolution and the onslaught of technological innovations in 
Europe during the 19th century sparked a lively debate among philosophers and social 
scientists regarding the existence and use of colonies. As many European countries 
sought cheap sources of labor in new colonial enterprises, the discussion centered on 
justifying this exploitation. How did the indigenous peoples fit into policies of expanding 
capitalist ventures and the liberal, bourgeois lifestyle? African peoples were viewed as a 
raw resource in dire need of refinement and civil-ization, treated as a cog in the vast 
industrial machine. Seeing as race science was "all the rage in Europe" at the time, 
creating a colonial bureaucracy based on racial ideologies was the easiest form of 
implementation and manipulation (Gourevitch, 2005, pp. 198). Through religion and 
science, European authorities would use both conventional and modern means to 
rationalize colonization. 
Religious justification, dominantly through the Hamitic hypothesis, appealed to 
European morality of the day. Originating from the Judaic and Christian Old Testament, 
the story of Ham begins with an inebriated Noah lying naked and incapacitated. While 
Noah's other sons averted their eyes from the scene, Ham did not. The myth follows that 
the descendants of Ham, full of sin for not acknowledging his father's shame, were to 
become Negro Africans. 
While Genesis says nothing about the descendants of Ham being black, 
the claim that they were cursed by being black first appeared in the oral 
traditions of the Jews when these were recorded in the sixth-century 
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Babylonian Talmud; that same myth depicts Ham as a sinful man and his 
progeny as degenerates. (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 80-1) 
Ham, depicted as Caucasian, is considered the father of the peoples that moved into 
modem-day Egypt and Ethiopia;8 this group eventually migrated south to invade and 
conquer the land that was inhabited by Bantu tribes. Pre-colonial Rwandan history 
dictates this movement as that of the Tutsi; in correlation with finding available land for 
their grazing cattle they migrated into Hutu territory. The colonial classifications of Hutu 
and Tutsi are therefore rooted in the Hamitic hypothesis. In fact, the growing field of race 
science would provide deeper distinctions and racial undertones for the growing 
animosity between these groups, manipulating traditional distinctions of pastoral Tutsi 
and cultivating Hutu. 
The history of the two groups mirrored the religious justification for their racial 
differences; because it was believed that Hamitic descendants were once Caucasian, or at 
least had closer ancestry to Europeans, Tutsi dominance was established in the eyes of 
the Germans and then Belgians.9 In fact, kings and leaders at the time of colonization 
were Tutsi, which only supported colonial claims of Tutsi superiority. Therefore, the 
"real" Africans were the Hutu, descendants of the migrating Bantu tribes and seen as the 
original inhabitants of the land. Langford (2005) comments: 
This viewpoint . .. emanates, with its various religious, biological and cultural 
variants, from the writings of an English colonial explorer, John Speke, who 
came to Africa in search of the source of the River Nile. When he entered 
8 Mahmood Mamdani delivers an extremely detailed account of the various versions and mutations of the 
Hamitic hypothesis in When Victims Become Killers, p. 76-87. 
9 The Belgians gained control of the Rwand�n territory as a result of German defeat in WWI. 
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the Great Lakes region, he was moved to make a comparison between the 
kingdoms of this region and those encountered on his previous visit to 
Somalia. From this comparison, there emerged the 'theory' of an aristocracy 
of pastoralists of Abyssinian origin falling within the wider colonialist 
vision that all traces or elements of civilisation in Africa were the result of 
external and non-indigenous people or influences. (p. 23) 
Religious and scientific justification worked in conjunction to fully exhibit the black 
African as the "other." 
Although it began with German colonialism, the Belgians exacerbated scientific 
racism. Eugenics was supported by tangible evidence and not just religious or historical 
myth. Measurements of nose and torso length, forehead width, skull sizes, even average 
heights and bone structure, were calculated, recorded, and used as a determining factor in 
the categorization of Hutu and Tutsi for those whose familial lineage was unclear. 10 
Aside from the overt racist nature of such practices, by modem standards this "exact" 
science was untenable at best; generations of intermarriage and dominant/recessive 
genetics make it highly unlikely that either group had remarkably distinct features as to 
warrant such segregation. By forcing all of the Rwandans into a specific group, it created 
a "distinct internal homogeneity" in which the group would "reproduce itself from within 
itself' (Langford, 2005, p. 2). In addition to the 1926 institution of identity cards stating 
which ethnic category one belonged to, 11 all areas of daily life, including the school 
system and local administration, would reinforce the racial differences. 
10 Erin Baines (2003) writes a compelling essay regarding these practices and the "body politics" of the 
genocide. 
11 Identity cards would not be eliminated from Rwandan life until after the genocide, 63 years later. 
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Colonial Practices of Forced Labor 
With colonialism came a new form of European-styled bureaucratic 
administration. "Force was integral to the process of exploitation - particularly forced 
labor" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 95). The Belgians transformed the power structure in 
Rwanda with the ultimate goal of deflating the power of the monarchy and increasing the 
power of local chiefs who were more efficiently manipulated (furthermore, centralizing 
the power of the chiefs). Prior to colonization, the "trinity of chiefs" consisted of the chief 
of pastures (a Tutsi), the chief of the land (a Hutu), and the chief of men (usually a Tutsi) 
(Mamdani, 2005, p. 90). It was a system which had "served to protect the [Ba]hutu 
peasantry against undue exactions" (Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 119-20). However, Belgian 
administration unraveled the Rwandan system at its core. Animosity and distrust 
developed between the Hutu and Tutsi as colonists redirected support from one group to 
the other; Europeans attempted to play the Hutus and the Tutsis against one another, 
while subjecting both groups to an increasingly despotic state. 
That is not to say, however, that the Rwandans were so easily manipulated. As 
Des Forges (1999) writes: 
Rwandan officials were not helpless pawns but rather real players in the 
game of administrative reform. Politically astute, they understood how to 
evade the intent of European orders even while apparently conforming to 
them. Chiefs and sub-chiefs seemed to accept the reduction in numbers of 
officials, but in fact kept on using unofficial representatives out on the hills 
who continued living off the local people. As a result, the density of 
administration and consequent customary burdens on the people diminished 
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little, if at all, in the central part of the country, while in the north and 
southwest, they actually increased because of the installation of resident 
officials. At the same time, the chiefs and sub-chiefs-and later other 
administrative agents-enforced a series of wholly new demands imposed 
by the colonialists as part of their effort to integrate Rwanda into the world 
economy. They often found ways to tum these new requirements, such as 
building roads or planting cash crops, to their personal profit. (p. 33) 
Yet, the majority (if not all) of these aforementioned positions belonged to the Tutsi. 
With the disparities in education and jobs in the colonial bureaucracy awarded to the 
Tutsi, the Hutus were consistently marginalized.12 
In 1924, Belgian authorities reinstituted Rwabugiri's ubureetwa, requiring that the 
Rwandans work for 42 days a year, though it was hardly a regular occurrence. There are 
reports that in some areas it was upwards of 142 days a year of forced labor (Mamdani, 
2001, p. 97). This practice was required of Hutu only, and "more than any other, it 
testified to the existence of Tutsi privilege in colonial Rwanda and highlighted the social 
separation between the petit Tutsi and the average Hutu" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 98). Labor 
practices proved to be a significantly divisive element between these two groups, as it 
became the physical reinforcement of Tutsi superiority coupled with the consistent 
subjugation of the Hutu majority. How the colonial authorities perceived the Hutu and 
Tutsi, and the way in which they utilized and exploited these differences, created a 
12 Lemarchand (1994) states that "although [Burundi] shar[ed] a similar ethnic map -with Tutsi 
pastoralists said to represent approximately 14% of the total population, Hutu agriculturalists 85%, and 
Pygmoid Twa 1 % -- only in Rwanda was Tutsi overrule highly institutionalized. Burundi society was 
characterized by greater complexity and fluidity, with power gravitating into the hands of a princely 
oligarchy (the so-called ganwa) whose identity was separate from that of either Hutu or Tutsi . Which helps 
explain why Burundi acceded to independence as yet untouched by the revolutionary upheavals during 
1959-62 that brought the Hutu in Rwanda to power." (p. 58 1 )  
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relationship of oppression that would be the breeding ground for generations of 
animosity. 
Over the following 30 years, the Hutu became restless and resentful towards both 
the colonial government and their Tutsi counterparts. "To consolidate the growing Hutu 
social movement towards 'equality,' Hutu intellectuals reproduced colonial histories of 
the 'alien' Tutsi and the 'indigenous' Hutu" (Baines, 2003, p. 481) reinforcing the idea 
that the Tutsi were "outsiders" who had migrated into Hutu land. The Hutus were 
politically and economically marginalized (Newbury, 1995, p. 12) and as their resentment 
began to transform into a growing social movement, the Belgian authorities shifted 
policies to favor the Hutu (including replacing ubureetwa with taxation in 1949) 
(Mamdani, 2001, p. 116). Boudreaux (2009) notes, "these reforms may have been an 
attempt, on the part of the Belgians, to lessen ethnic tensions or it may have been a way 
to promote loyalty in a group that then might favor a continued Belgian presence in the 
country" (p. 3). Either way, the Tutsis resisted the change. Rather than embracing the 
principles of unified self-determination, as was the catalyst for many independence 
movements across the colonial world, Rwanda was a nation divided. 
Tensions came to a head in 1959. A group of educated Hutu documented their 
intentions and beliefs in the Hutu Manifesto, a written presentation of the situation in 
Rwanda revolving around racial ideologies of Hutu superiority. The writers of the 
Manifesto created the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (P ARMEHUTU), a 
political party formalized on the notion of returning Rwanda to its "original" state, one in 
which the Hutu, as its first inhabitants and the majority of the population, were central to 
the leadership, governance, and future; a state which would be devoid of Tutsi. In 
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response, the Tutsi committed to maintaining their leadership through the continuation of 
the monarchy after independence, formed the Rwanda National Union (UNAR) party. 
Langford (2005) notes that these two political parties: 
. . .  [and the] form of the post-colonial nation-state was, therefore, linked to 
the outcome of a struggle between two racial groups. This struggle was 
resolved through the 'social revolution' of November 1959, a 
'spontaneous' Hutu uprising which expelled the Tutsi king, chiefs and 
administrative cadre from Rwanda, and situated the PARMEHUTU as the 
dominant representative of the Hutu people." (p. 5) 
Thousands of Tutsis fled the country, and the UNAR (later to become the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front, or RPF) were operating in exile. In the following four years, Rwanda 
would experience a state in flux coupled with great violence. The now ruling Hutu were 
determined to maintain their power, no matter the cost to the people or land. 
Umuganda in the First and Second Republics, 1962-1985 
Under the auspices of establishing a nation-state in which the Hutu were political, 
socially, and economically more powerful than their Tutsi counterparts, independent 
Rwanda was born. Gregoire Kayibanda, the leader of the P ARMEHUTU and the 
President of the Republic, was determined to maintain Hutu superiority at the expense of 
multi-partyism and ideological separation from the colonial state. For example, 
Kayibanda and the First Republic maintained the use of identity cards in order to assure a 
clear demarcation between those who were Hutu and those who were Tutsi; rather than 
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build a sense of Rwandan nationalism after independence, this continued division 
encouraged a new nation built on racial identity. "In this manner, the First Republic 
maintained an essential continuity with the previous colonial system through its racial 
demarcation of the people who composed its nation-state" (Vidal, 1995, pp. 16-17 as 
quoted in Langford, 2005, p. 6). All prospects of a multi-party democracy were gradually 
abolished as continued invasions from organized Tutsi refugees occurred through the 
1960s. These invasions gave Kayibanda reason to peg the Tutsi as true "outsiders" and 
served to reinforce the idea of Hutus belonging to Rwanda, while the Tutsi were merely 
trying to force themselves upon the nation. Any indication of Tutsi entrance into the 
political system was perceived as an "invasion" into governance; therefore Rwanda was 
increasingly a de facto single-party state under the P ARMEHUTU. 
After independence, the rural peasantry did not see any drastic change in their 
daily lives. The Hutu elite began to enjoy the luxuries once only afforded to Tutsi and 
colonial authorities, yet the majority of the Rwandan peasantry remained impoverished. It 
was during this time that Kayibanda, the former head of Trafipro (a national coffee 
cooperative), began to institute coffee as "Rwanda's major export and the primary source 
of foreign currency" (Kamola, 2007, p. 580). Kayibanda, a businessman from the 
southern region of Gitarama, concentrated his development efforts in his home region, 
supplying jobs and appointments based greatly on patronage and nepotism. This 
regionalism developed divisions within the PARMEHUTU. "Ironically, the Kayibanda 
regime faced growing criticism in the 1960s that it had not done enough to advance Hutu 
representation in civil society" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 13 5). These criticisms of both 
education and employment came from Hutu (predominately living in the northern regions 
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of the country) and posed as the basis for a successful coup d'etat led by Kayibanda's 
cousin General Juvenal Habyarimana in 1973. 
Habyarimana continued Kayibanda' s development efforts by economically 
focusing agriculture on the production of coffee. One of the main differences between 
Kayibanda's administration and that of his successor was that Habyarimana understood 
the need to utilize all Rwandans as a work force. In order to do so, he would have to 
reclassify Tutsi to be a legally viable source of production. 
The key change from the First to the Second Republic - a change that seems 
to have gone unnoticed by many an observer of Rwandan politics - was a 
shift in the political identity of the Tutsi from a race to an ethnic group. 
While the First Republic considered the Tutsi a 'race,' the Second Republic 
reconstructed the Tutsi as an 'ethnicity' and, therefore, a group indigenous 
to Rwanda ... As a 'race' under the First Republic, the Tutsi had been 
confined to the civic sphere and barred from the political sphere; as an 
'ethnicity' under the Second Republic, however, they were allowed 
participation in the political sphere, but limited to a scope said to befit their 
minority status. (Mamdani, 2001, p. 138) 
Habyarimana's political party, Mouvement Revolutionaire National pour le 
Developpement (MRND), became the political party of all Rwandan citizens. While the 
one-party state was an attempt to create a form of unity and nationalism among 
Rwandans, a quota system in which all state apparatus would be proportional to the 
population (89% Hutu, 10% Tutsi, and 1 % Twa) maintained that the Hutu would remain 
firmly in control (Langford, 2005, p. 9-10). 
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Habyarimana made umuganda the centerpiece for Rwandan development. 
(Re)Established in 1974, umuganda made the peasantry responsible for ensuring Rwanda 
was an economically, self-sufficient nation. Rwanda was to serve as a role model for 
newly independent nations across the African continent, and the glorification of the 
peasantry under umuganda demonstrated their importance in this venture. Philip 
Verwimp (2000) discusses the stress Habyarimana placed on participation in manual 
labor, as well as the policies that were instituted to support and create growth among the 
labor force, which included the dissolution of any family planning programs - "more 
people means more peasants and thus a larger supply of labor" (p. 343). In addition, 
coercing all Rwandans to work achieved another aim - peasants felt triumphant as 
intellectuals were aptly humiliated and forced to join in with the manual laborers. 
Quelling dissent among the most educated through the implementation of umuganda 
reinforced then-current interpretations of "development ideology," mainly that Rwanda 
was a poor rural society; in addition, keeping Rwandan intellectuals on the same playing 
field as their uneducated counterparts ensured that Habyarimana stayed in power 
(Boudreaux, 2009, p. 9). 
The institution of umuganda maintained that the peasantry, Hutu and Tutsi alike, 
shared social and economic responsibility under the auspices of the MRND single-party 
state; as Habyarimana states in a 1973 speech, "one who refuses to work is harmful to 
society" (Langford, 2005, p. 10-11 ). While umuganda created a stable social order, three 
conditions emerged that would be contributing factors to the future development of the 
country: the refocus of a monetized economy towards a physical labor system, the 
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promotion of nationalism and inclusion (though within the ethnic delineations of their 
group), and efficient mobilization of the population. 
First, as the economy refocused away from the "monetization" that occurred under 
colonialism it moved towards a rudimentary system based on physical and tangible labor. 
Although a self-proclaimed champion of the peasantry, Habyarimana was fearful of 
slums and encouraged civilians to take up residence in the highlands on their own farms, 
rather than migrate towards the major city centers. In addition, umuganda promoted 
nationalism through a "return to ancestral values" and to "engage one's self' in working 
towards the collective good (Verwimp, 2000, p. 345). If people were living in relative 
isolation, then mandatory labor would provide an opportunity for community and the 
promotion of Rwandan identity. 
Finally, umuganda became a way to efficiently mobilize the peasantry. A call to 
work was ingrained in the habitual actions of each Rwandan citizen. This became 
exceptionally important during the genocide as the peasants were called to kill their 
neighbors, to contribute to umuganda, and work towards the collective good of ridding 
Rwanda of the Tutsi and any Hutu dissidents. 
The main focus of the economy under the Habyarimana regime was coffee 
production, although umuganda was also utilized to build infrastructure, including roads, 
schools, and hospitals. Coffee, its high international demand combined with the fertility 
of Rwandan soil, became the focus of agricultural production across the country. 
Rwanda gained the ability to compete fairly with large coffee-producing nations in the 
worldwide market as a formal member of the International Coffee Organization (ICO) 
established in 1962. However, the production quotas established by the ICO resulted in a 
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growing environmental crisis for the country. Kamola (2007) notes, "quotas locked 
many African countries into small, inflexible market shares during a period of increased 
international demand" (p. 581). The ability of Rwandans to produce coffee under the 
auspices of umuganda, in addition to high international demand, resulted in an increased 
GDP under the Habyarimana regime. 13 
However, while the majority of land was being designated for coffee production, 
less was being used to produce food; the stress on the land was severe considering the 
Rwandan population was growing at an exponential rate. When the coffee economy 
collapsed in the 1980s, Rwandans were left in an acute and life-threatening situation; this 
economic vulnerability of the Rwandan peasantry allowed the Habyarimana regime to 
tighten its control and set the stage for genocide. 
Collapse of the Economy 
The collapse of global coffee prices, famine (resulting from years of 
environmental degradation), and the required implementation of a Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP) by international aid organizations further enforced anti-Tutsi rhetoric 
stemming from the Habyarimana administration. Initially, Habyarimana' s forced 
implementation of umuganda made important achievements, such as "the development of 
infrastructure (roads in particular), in the expansion of schools and health centers, in 
reforestation programs, and in attempts to promote increased agricultural production" 
13 See Table 3 on p. 44 
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(Newbury, 2005, p. 14). However, this initial success would soon become the by­
product of a global economic crisis due to a number of factors: 
... First, Rwanda was heavily dependent on export revenue from the sale of 
coffee and tea and the prices for both commodities fell sharply during this 
period. [In addition,] 'coffee export receipts fell from $144 mio (sec) in 
1985 (an exceptionally good year) to $30 mio (sec) in 1993.' Second, after 
1990, the government diverted its limited resources to the war effort, 
fighting the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) .. . Habyarimana 
diverted upwards of 40 percent of the national budget to military purposes 
between 1990 and 1994. And third, in 1990 the government agreed to a 
structural adjustment program that led to 40 percent currency devaluation, 
higher prices, higher taxes, and increased fees for a variety of services 
(education, health, etc.). (Uvin, 1997, p. 106; Cannon, 2005, p. 6, as quoted 
in Boudreaux, 2009, p. 4) 
The history of the peasantry and the use of umuganda are directly related to the (over)use 
of land and environmental degradation that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, as 
forced labor coincides with environmental practices (Newbury & Newbury, 2000, p. 
870). The colonial polices of treating the land as small, separate spaces rather than in one 
large ecological context were transferred into post-colonial human-environment 
interactions. For example, "burning the fields was outlawed, complicating the 
maintenance of pasturage. Reforestation entailed planting eucalyptus trees ... [which] 
were deleterious to the productive system .. . the toxicity of their roots makes them 
unsuitable for intercropping" (Newbury & Newbury, 2000, p. 871). Since decades of soil 
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degradation made much of the Rwandan countryside unsuitable for sustaining a variety of 
agriculture, people turned to the steep slopes to plant their crops, cattle were scarce, and 
"mobility was reduced so that people no longer had access to valley or forest resources" 
(Newbury & Newbury, 2000, p. 871). 
To further compound the agricultural situation, Habyarimana's resistance to any 
implementation of family planning resulted in a surge in the Rwandan population. Under 
the auspices of his pro-peasant ideology, deregulating birth control meant that there 
would be more workers for, and therefore more production of, collective works projects. 
In retrospect, "these policies were in fact virulently anti-peasant . . . Rwandan women had 
the highest birthrate in the world . .. [and] from the perspective of the dictator, people are 
production forces, which are used to produce coffee and to supply labor to 'collective 
works' (umuganda)" (Verwimp, 2000, pp. 341-343). Verwimp (2000) notes that 
Habyarimana publicly recognized the population issue facing Rwanda, though he had a 
tendency to blame over-population and the ensuing famine in the late 1980s on the Tutsi, 
all which reinforced "the message [that] Rwanda had space for only one ethnic group" (p. 
344). Umuganda allowed the leaders to profit while the peasantry became paupers 
(Bezy, 1990 as quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 746). In fact, many scholars consider 
ecological resource scarcity coupled with one of the highest population growth rates a 
root cause of the genocide; "Rwanda is often considered a perfect example of this hard 
Malthusian argument" (Uvin, 2001, p. 82). 
The global economic crisis of the late 1970s hit the developing world especially 
hard. International aid organizations, such as the World Bank, created an "array of small­
farmer and community-level projects" that proved to be unsuccessful (Bates, 2008, p. 
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113). In examining the failure, the World Bank laid the foundation for future Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAP) that would be implemented throughout much of the 
developing world. Bates (2008) notes: 
In its famed "Berg Report," the Bank documented the tendency of Africa's 
governments to adopt policies that distorted market prices and undermined 
economic incentives and so crippled growth and development. In addition 
to being a financer of projects, the World Bank then became an advisor to 
governments ... Sectoral programs soon gave way to country programs and 
to conditionality, as the Bank sought to strengthen further its leverage over 
policymakers in debtor nations and to sharpen the incentives for policy 
reform. (p. 114-115) 
As a way to hold government officials accountable for instituting these policy reforms, an 
addendum to financial aid would require African leaders to take steps towards multi­
partyism, usually in the form of open elections. 
The plummet of global coffee prices in the late 1980s (dropping by roughly 50% ), 
forced income to fall from "$144 million in 1985 to $30 million in 1993;" not only was 
the average coffee farmer negatively affected by the decrease in exports but also by the 
"sharp devaluation of Rwandan currency" following the implementation of the SAP in 
1990 (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 147-8). The World Bank regarded the failures to eliminate 
coffee subsidies and reduce the budget deficit as breaking the contractual agreement so 
they "refused to provide the second tranche of structural adjustment credit" (Mamdani, 
2001, p. 148). Economically, the Rwandan government was already in dire straits; 
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however, the political situation would further erode any development efforts over the 
course of the next four years. 
The SAP design for Rwanda included a number of stipulations that would 
theoretically decrease the influence of the MRND and encourage the development of a 
multi-party system. 
This programme entailed the removal of MRND one-party state control over 
the economy (abolition of taxation, tariffs, and quantitative restrictions on 
international commerce, reduction of state spending and privatization of 
state enterprises) coupled with devaluation of the national currency. It was 
to be combined with a marked contraction of both personnel employed by 
the state and ofrevenues available to the state. (Langford, 2005, p. 24) 
However, the invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in October of 1990 "enabled the 
MRND one-party state to discard its previous discourse of development and to present 
the reassertion of its authority in an overtly racial discourse in which the state was 
represented as a Hutu state threatened by internal and external enemies" (Langford, 2005, 
p. 11). 
The RPF were heavily outnumbered within the first week of invasion after the 
sudden death of their leader, Fred Rwigema. They retreated back across the border into 
Uganda to regroup. For Rwandans, the invasion resulted in heavy, long-term increases in 
military spending as the MRND and government forces prepared for any future onslaught 
(Marysse, et al. , 1994, p. 36). Shortly thereafter, in yet another violation of the SAP 
agreement, the Habyarimana regime began to accept aid directly from Belgium and 
France. The MRND would forgo any move towards multi-partyism by further 
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consolidating its control and this unintended consequence meant the end of any hope for 
international diplomatic aid. 
Contrary to the assumption that all the Rwandan peasantry unquestionably obeyed 
government elites, there were a number of resistance movements, both organized and 
unorganized, that developed in the early 1990s across the countryside. Smith (1998) 
comments, "in the period from 1989 to 1993, the state had much to fear" (p. 746). One 
calculated act of resistance towards the current economic and political climate came in 
the form of 300,000 burned coffee trees (Pottier & Nkundabashaka, 1991, p. 151), of 
which many were planted by umuganda (Longman, 1995, p. 19). In fact, the resistance 
movements had become so widespread that even "umuganda and political animations 
became passe, simply because people refused to participate any longer" (Smith, 1998, p. 
746). The refusal to participate in umuganda is significant, primarily because first, it is 
the ultimate rejection of the economic and government system under Habyarimana and 
second, an exercise in the only effective threat that the Rwandan peasantry could harbor 
against the administration. 
The consequences of prolonged social and economic tensions were also impacted 
by the waves of refugees that crossed over Rwandan borders, both coming and going, 
from the late 1950s through the early 1990s. There were three major periods of exodus 
for Rwandan Tutsis: 1959-1961, 1963-1964, and 1973; the first came after the revolution, 
the second was "triggered by the repression that followed each major inyenzi attempts to 
restore Tutsi power through armed attacks," and the third as a result of the internal 
political crisis and the transition from the First to Second Republic (Mamdani, 2001, p. 
160). General estimations place between 400,000 and 600,000 Tutsi refugees in 
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neighboring countries during this period of time (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 8). 
Refugee status remained in flux in most neighboring countries; changing laws and 
legislation regarding who was considered to be an official refugee forced many into 
vulnerable situations, including displacement, deportation, and the onslaught of 
xenophobic attacks from local civilians. 
The planning of genocide occurred before April of 1994; organized, state­
sponsored massacres of Tutsi in 1990 and 1991 were the answer to Habyarimana's 
problem of civil unrest. The invasion of the RPF caused much disorder and rebellion -
the MRND needed to restore its authority: 
In the northern communes ... [there were] localized massacres of the Tutsi 
population (October 1990, Kibilira and Mutara; January 1991, Bagogwe 
region). The importance of these massacres rests upon the manner in which 
they were organized and directed by local officials of the 
MRND ...  Although these massacres were carried out in the context of 
continuing conflict with the RPF in the northern prefectures, they 
demonstrated the capacity of the MRND to direct, and for its local officials 
to implement, a programme of killings. (Langford, 2005, p. 12) 
The ability to efficiently practice the mobilization of citizens is the rationale for these 
massacres prior to the genocide. Mamdani (2001) notes "the civilian Hutu population 
was urged and organized to defend itself against an expected massacre by the RPF and its 
civilian collaborators" (p. 192). In fact, many scholars suggest that the structural 
organization for the genocide was well in place as early as 1992: 
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It involved four distinctive levels of activity or sets of actors: (a) the akazu 
("little house" in Kinyarwanda), that is the core group, consisting of 
Habyarimana' s immediate entourage, i.e. his wife (Agathe), his three 
brothers-in-law (Protee Zigiranyirazo, Seraphin Rwabukumba and Elie 
Sagatwa), and a sprinkling of trusted advisors (most notably Joseph 
Nzirorera, Laurent Serubuga and Ildephonse Gashumba); (b) the rural 
organizers, numbering anywhere from two to three hundred, drawn from the 
communal and prefectoral cadres; ( c) the militas (interahamwe ), estimated 
at 30,000, forming the ground-level operatives in charge of doing the actual 
killing; ( d) the presidential guard, recruited exclusively among northerners, 
and trained with a view to providing auxiliary slaughterhouse support to 
civilian death squads. (Lemarchand, 1995, 10) 
The Use of Umuganda in the Genocide 
34 
The genocide began on April 7, 1994, the day after President Habyarimana's 
plane was shot down while returning from peace talks with the RPF in neighboring 
Arusha, Tanzania. The Arusha Accords were an attempt to develop a system of power 
sharing within the Rwandan government between the MRND and the RPF, or 
symbolically, between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Lemarchand (1995) remarks: 
. . . .  the RPF would have a total of five cabinet seats out of a total of 21, and 
eleven seats in the transitional national assembly out of a total of 70, 
putting it on par with the ruling MRND. Compromise, likewise, was the 
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name of the game in the restructuring of the armed forces: 40 per cent of 
the troops and 50 per cent of the officer corps would consist of RPF 
elements. (p. 9) 
Following the aforementioned localized massacres, the genocide was to ensure that there 
would be no compromise or power sharing with the RPF, or the Tutsi in general. 
Amid chaos and confusion, the plane crash was blamed on the RPF and Tutsi 
forces both within and outside of Rwanda. While current scholarship reports that Hutu 
extremists are most likely responsible for the assassination of the President, Radio 
Rwanda and the independently owned Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines 
(R TLM) implicated the Tutsi inyenzi as the culprits. Radio was an extremely effective 
communication medium for the rapid implementation of genocide; "hate media" and the 
publication of the Ten Hutu Commandments after the first RPF invasion solidified and 
reinforced Hutu extremism. 
Invoking a sense of biblical duty, the Ten Hutu Commandments were repeatedly 
broadcast across the nationally-sponsored Radio Rwanda and extremist RTLM: 
1. Every Muhutu should know that a Mututsi woman, wherever she is, 
works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall 
consider a traitor any Muhutu who: 
marries a Tutsi woman, 
befriends a Tutsi woman, 
employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine. 
2. Every Muhutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable 
and conscientious in their role as woman, wife and mother of the family. 
Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? 
3. Bahutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers 
and sons back to reason. 
4. Every Muhutu should know that every Mututsi is dishonest in 
business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, 
any Muhutu who does the following is a traitor: 
makes a partnership with Batutsi in business, 
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invests his money or the government's money in a Tutsi 
enterprise, 
lends or borrows money for a Mututsi, gives favours to Batutsi in 
business (obtaining import licences, bank loans, construction 
sites, public markets ... ). 
5. All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, and 
military and security should be entrusted to Bahutu. 
6. The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be 
majority Bahutu. 
7. The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The 
experience of the October [1990] war has taught us a lesson. No member 
of the military shall marry a Tutsi. 
8. The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi. 
9. The Bahutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and 
be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. 
The Bahutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for 
friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu 
brothers; 
They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda; 
The Bahutu must be firm and vigilant against their common 
Tutsi enemy. 
10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the 
Hutu Ideology, must be taught to every Muhutu at every level. Every Hutu 
must spread this ideology widely. Any Muhutu who persecutes his brother 
Muhutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology, is a traitor. 
(Munyaneza, 1999, 37) 
36 
Through the use of radio, the invocation of umuganda, and the euphemism of "work" 
incited killings: family members, neighbors, average, non-militant people committed 
murder. Li (2007) states, " RTLM's notorious use of 'work' as a euphemism (with 
machetes as 'tools') needs to be understood in the context of development, with 
participation (manning roadblocks, taking part in night patrols, conducting house 
searches, clearing fields) being likened to umuganda on a number of occasions" (p. 96). 
This overt use of "existing discourses of development" played into the collective 
conscious of national survival - the Tutsis must be eradicated in order to further 
progress Rwanda economically, politically, and socially (Li, 2007, in Thompson, 2007, p. 
96). The mass exile of Tutsis since independence allowed for prejudice to increase 
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developmentally. Radio often manipulated already engrained fears regarding the return 
of these refugees: one broadcast stated, "When you kill the rat do not let the pregnant one 
escape . . .  We made the mistake thirty years ago of letting them flee into exile, this time 
none will escape" (Isbister, 1998, p. 133). 
As discussed, it is problematic to assume that all Rwandan citizens are open to 
manipulation; yet, one must not underestimate the influence of radio as the primary 
source of communication to citizens nor how it impacted a strictly programmed and 
scheduled population: 
In contemplating the question of obedience in the genocide, it is important 
to note that the capture and mobilization of state resources by its 
orchestrators mirrored a gradual appropriation of the cornerstones of 
collective life for the purposes of the killing. The genocide extended beyond 
bureaucracies to other everyday routines and contexts . . .  Radio, which 
bookends and punctuates the daily routine of many ordinary Rwandans, 
continued to do so during the genocide. RTLM did not simply whip Hutu 
into a frenzy to channel fear and anger into sudden attacks. Rather, through 
the daily diet of informational updates, operational details (not to leave 
bodies on the road in view of Western journalists, for example), and 
encouraging monologues, it contributed to the framing of schedules and the 
routinization of"work." (Li, 2004, p. 20) 
The discourse of Rwandan history and development, steeped in collective action, was 
exploited. As Li (2004) comments, "active participation in the genocide [was] broader 
than simple hatred or fear [because of] the context in which euphemisms such as 'work' 
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and 'cockroaches' could be easily understood" (p. 13). Young people, the target 
audience for the independent R TLM, believed that in killing Tuts is and Hutu dissidents, 
they were working for the development of the country. The glorification of the peasantry 
created the foundations of a killing force, generated and enforced by young Hutu 
militants (Jnterahamwe) eager to contribute. "Chilling broadcasts invited listeners to join 
in the killing, as if this were an appeal to patriotism: 'The grave is only half-full. Who 
will help us fill it?' (Mamdani, 2001, p. 212). The use of radio to incite genocide as an 
act of umuganda reinforced an already established organizational structure for mass 
murder; during the 1980s, the MRND made a number of decisions regarding umuganda 
that directly relates to the organization of the genocide, in which Verwimp (2000) has 
chronicled in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Comparison of decisions regarding Umuganda 
A) Decisions of November 12, 1982 Organization of the genocide 
1 .  Members of the National Umuganda 1 .  The highest authorities of the country 
Commission: including: 
- The secretary-general of the MRND - The President 
(President) 
President and secretary-general of the -
- Ministry of Planning :MRND 
- Ministry of Public Works - All MRND ministers and important 
army officers together with the 
- Ministry of Agriculture brothers of Habyarimana organize 
- Ministry of the Interior genocide in Rwanda from 1 990 to 
1 994 
- Vice President of the CND 
- Secretary-general of the Chamber of 
Commerce 
2. At the level of the prefecture, a Commission 2. MRND officials given orders to execute 
in charge of Umuganda composed of MRND massacres in the 1 990- 1 994 period. They lead 
officials is installed the population in the execution of the genocide 
3 .  Rehabilitation of manual labor and 3 .  National and local officials use the word 
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obligatory nature of Umuganda Umuganda to describe the killing 
4. Local officials have to feel concerned about 4. The population should act like one person to 
the political weight of the Umuganda destroy the forces of evil 
institution, serve as an example and manage the 
population 
5.  One should allocate the task in a 5. Individuals are forced to kill, implicate most 
proportional way in order to appreciate the Hutu in the killing. Refusal to kill is a death 
work of each group objectively warrant 
6. For the Communal Works of Development, 6.  Machetes, an agricultural tool most 
each participant must bring his own equipment. Rwandans own, is the main instrument used in 
Only heavy or collective material will be given the killing. Firearms are used by officials in 
by the Cell case of resistance 
7. Accumulation of unfinished projects or not 7. Propaganda calls upon peasants to finish the 
useful projects must be avoided project, meaning that nobody should escape 
Umuganda projects have to be harmonized 
with national programs 
8.  The militants must be informed on the 8.  Members of the genocidal government tell 
results of the C ommunal Works for peasants not to hesitate to kill because killing is 
Development, the destination of the products of already going on in the rest of the country 
the harvest and on the evolution of Umuganda 
in other parts of the country 
B) Decisions of June 27, 1984 Or2anization of the 2enocide 
1 .  Decision the hours of work for Umuganda 1 .  At public meetings and on the radio, 
and on the radio broadcasting for Umuganda government officials incite the Hutu population 
to do a special Umuganda 
2. Umuganda will take seven hours starting 2. Genocidal government decides who shall be 
from the place of work killed first and who next 
3 .  The official responsible fo r  Umuganda at 3 .  Local offici�ls determine the start and the 
the level of the Cell will decide when end of the killing. lnterahamwe ("those who 
Umuganda finishes, but one should not leave work together") kill day and night 
the place before 1 0  o'clock 
4. In order to strengthen the sensitization for 4. Radio Rwanda and Radio Collines provide 
Mille Umuganda, the Central Committee has false information on the RPF and incite killing 
decided that Radio Rwanda will provide 
broadcasting on Umuganda and animation 
C) Decisions of April 10, 1986 Or2anization of the 2enocide 
1 .  A price of 1 ,000,000 FRW will be given to 1 .  Various incentives used to implicate people 
the Commune ranked first in the Umuganda in the killing, from giving free beer, the chance 
activities. This price will be inscribed on the to loot the house of the killed person, to extract 
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budget of the MRND presidency cash from victims and grab a plot of land 
Source: Verwitnp, 2000, pp. 352-353 
With its roots in the creation of a stable social order in order to enforce the 
importance of the Rwandan peasantry, umuganda was utilized and exploited in the 
efficient mobilization of these very same peasants to commit acts of genocide. The 
structural development of the MRND's genocide machine helps to dismantle one 
prominent ideology of the Rwandan peasantry - they are psychologically pre­
dispositioned to obedience, so if they are ordered to kill, they kill. "The obedience 
explanation is very popular because it nicely complements the popular elite manipulation 
model," Uvin (2001, p. 84) notes. Ultimately, this dynamic demonstrates that the leaders, 
rather than the followers, are guilty. 
Placing the ultimate blame on those in charge also helps to explain the role of 
reluctant Hutus, of which there were many. Punishments, "ranging in severity from the 
destruction of personal property to incarceration and death" were broadcast over RTLM 
and "communicated repeatedly in consciousness-raising meetings, speeches, songs, and 
slogans, all couched in terms of a communal or national duty" (Bhavnani, 2006, p. 666). 
It is this national duty, coupled with the threats of punishment that drive mass 
participation. The blanket assumption that all Rwandans are merely obedient ignores the 
methodical organization and influence of the elite and dilutes the blame onto each 
individual citizen. However, incorporating the institutionalization of umuganda supports 
the theory of elite manipulation, while dismissing the assumption that every Rwandan is 
merely subservient. 
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The Role of Umuganda in Post-Genocide Development 
Following the genocide that left close to 800,000 people dead, Rwanda was 
destroyed; infrastructure was burned to the ground amongst piles of corpses that clogged 
waterways and were haphazardly thrown into mass burials. The RPF defeated the 
MRND in July, just three months after Habyarimana's plane was shot down. General 
Paul Kagame, complete with a British education and U.S. military training, understood 
that "given the state of the nation' s distribution and transportation 
networks ... infrastructural development" was one of the first points of rebuilding (Ryan, 
2010, p. 14). Once again, umuganda would become the center of state development 
planning. 
It was important for Rwanda to move towards building a sustainable future after 
the initial reliance on humanitarian aid in the years following the genocide. Vision 2020 
became the government's first major development planning document and continually 
emphasized the role of the peasants and umuganda. The main goals included: 
1. Reconstruction of the nation and its social capital anchored on good 
governance, underpinned by a capable state; 
2. Transformation of agriculture into a productive, high value, market 
oriented sector, with forward linkages to other sectors; 
3. Development of an efficient private sector spearheaded by 
competitiveness and entrepreneurship; 
4. Comprehensive human resources development, encompassing 
education, health, and ICT skills aimed at public sector, private sector 
and civil society. To be integrated with demographic, health and 
gender issues; 
5. Infrastructural development, entailing improved transport links, energy 
and water supplies and ICT networks; 
6. Promotion of regional economic integration and cooperation. 
(MINECOFIN, 2000, pp. 4-5) 
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Referred to as the Six Pillars, the goals of Vision 2020 placed much importance on the 
cooperation of all Rwandan citizens in post-genocide development. Collaborative work 
environments could help to ease collective memory and promote social and political 
inclusion while also generating economic prosperity. In the promotion of a knowledge-
based economy, heralded as "the most important engine" of Rwanda's economic 
machine, Vision 2020 points to the use of umuganda and the "plentiful supply of cheap 
labour. .. making it easy to build infrastructure" (MINECOFIN, 2000, p. 9). The 
orchestration of umuganda would be initiated by government elites in the early stages of 
development, though the IMF (2000) notes in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 
I 
"the tradition of umuganda, community labour, needs to evolve from a top-down to a 
participatory mode in which communities take responsibility for the provision and 
maintenance of those local public goods which the state cannot finance" (p. 9). For 
example, Rwanda faced major environmental challenges in the late 1990's; deforestation 
and soil erosion left the countryside and agricultural cultivation at serious risk. In 2000, 
the Rwandan government "launched a program of afforestation under which 65,000 
hectares of forest [were] to be planted. About 80% of the costs are to be covered by 
umuganda" (IMF, 2000, pp. 27-28). Umuganda would not just rebuild the infrastructure 
and economy, but it would continually provide opportunities for interaction with both the 
state and fellow citizens: 
At the local government level, the key issue is of building trust and 
tolerance among and between individual citizens, ensuring greater 
empowerment and participation of citizens who are recovering from a 
legacy of no or partial participation in decision making and constrained 
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access to services. Activities suggested include sensitising and training all 
district, sector, cell & umudugudu leaders about unity and reconciliation, 
empowering districts to set up clear guidelines and principles for 
employment, recruitment and access to services; setting up unity clubs in all 
districts; facilitating the use of um uganda to discuss progress and 
constraints to achieving unity and reconciliation. (MINECOFIN, 2000, p. 
87) 
43 
According to government and international organization documents, the purpose of 
(re)implementing umuganda can be deconstructed to exemplify the significance of 
promoting inclusion through the rebuilding of infrastructure. The citizenry will reconnect 
to the state and one another by being a part of the development process; however, there 
are a number of questions that this policy strategy poses: can it be demonstrated that 
umuganda promotes social, political, and economic inclusion and development? Are 
these three areas of rebuilding independent or interdependent on one another? According 
to the World Bank Development Indicators (2011), Rwanda has made improvements in 
several areas since 2000: Gross Domestic Product has quadrupled ($1 .74 billion in 2000 
to $5.63 billion in 2010), infant mortality rate has nearly been cut in half (105 .7 deaths 
per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 59.1 in 2010), and the percentage of children who 
complete primary school has doubled (22% completion rate in 2000 to 54% completion 
rate in 2010). 
It is evident that by building a sustainable economic system immersed in the 
world market, Rwanda is getting closer to one of the government's primary goals -
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freedom from foreign aid. If looking at the growth of GDP alone, the implementation of 
umuganda has a direct impact, as demonstrated in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Gross Domestic Product, Rwanda, 1960-2010 
$ 6  B 
$5 B 
$4 B 
$3 B 
$2 B 
$1 B 
1 965 1970 1 975 1 980 1985 1 990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2011, http://data.worldbank.org/data­
catalog/world-development-indicators 
When Habyarimana touted umuganda as central to the development plans 
instituted in 1974, the national GDP rose steadily from $309 million to $2.6 billion in 
1990, before the implementation of SAPs and internal political conflicts adversely 
affected the whole of the Rwandan economy. Similarly, using umuganda as the primary 
source of labor for the rebuilding of infrastructure in post-genocide Rwanda, the growth 
rate has been impressive. 
However, hindsight demonstrates that GDP cannot be the sole indication of 
sustainability. There are (at least) three different measures of "development:" economic 
growth, political development, and human development; GDP speaks solely to economic 
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growth but fails to measure other important activities, such as "the construction of 
democratic institutions, the establishment of a performing banking system, the rule of law 
and an independent judicial system, a free press, and access to health care and education" 
(Verwimp, 2000, p. 329). 
If we can assume, based on GDP alone, umuganda is encouraging economic growth, 
how does it fare in other areas of development, namely human and political? There is an 
obvious poetic notion in the concept of Rwandans, of all ages, socioeconomic, and 
political status, working collectively one Saturday a month to rebuild the nation's 
infrastructure; side-by-side constructing roads, schools, and hospitals while leaving the 
ethnic distinctions of Hutu and Tutsi presumably in the past (enforced through the 
illegality of these terms). 14 However, scholarship is divided as to the level of direct 
impact that umuganda has on social and political progress. Verwimp (2000) suggests 
that dictators like economic growth as it "gives them more resources to satisfy the elite's 
desire for consumption . . .  thereby increasing the dictator's power" (p. 333). Based on this, 
current use of umuganda can be viewed a political maneuver to solidify the elite's control 
of the peasants, much in the same way it was utilized under the Habyarimana 
administration. 
Umuganda can serve as ideal venue for the state to communicate with its citizens and 
implement other development goals. One such example is family planning. As Africa's 
most densely populated country, Rwanda is considered to be a quintessential Malthusian 
dilemma. An unregulated population will negatively result in environmental degradation, 
and therefore, famine, disease, and war. Legitimately, the Rwandan government is wary 
14 There are controversies surrounding the ability to be exempt from umuganda, especially if you are a 
member of the political elite. 
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of an expanding youth bulge - in order to potentially avoid problems of the past, the 
young men (and women) of the country need to be kept occupied and incorporated into 
the economic system. 
One key difference between the use of umuganda under the Habyarimana regime and 
that of the Kagame administration is the regulation and institution of family planning 
practices. As noted earlier, in his glorification of the peasantry, Habyarimana ignored the 
implementation of any forms of population control. More people meant more labor, 
which in tum, meant more production and wealth. Yet, uncontrolled population growth 
has had devastating consequences that Rwandans are currently confronting. 
In comparison, the contemporary implementation of umuganda may be no different 
than how citizens, women specifically, were exploited as the main contributors to the 
Rwandan labor force for many decades. According to Baines (2003), "the state, 
community, and family were highly dependent upon women to carry out free labour, and 
to reproduce the population. Social control was maintained by regulating sexuality, in 
addition to denial of basic citizenship rights - such as land ownership" ( 483). Though 
"regulating sexuality" is one aspect of the government control, it serves as an interesting 
vignette to the family planning conversation. Rwanda's population has doubled since the 
genocide, 5.8 million people in 1995 and 10.6 million in 2010 (World Bank, 2011). 
Family planning initiatives are an integral part of development, however, not an easy 
task. Anicet Nzabonimpa, Family Planning and HIV Integration Coordinator for 
Rwanda's Ministry of Health, stated, "It was very difficult to talk about family planning 
after the genocide . . .  people wanted to replace those who died" (Rosen, 2010). 
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There are multiple efforts to keep Rwandans from perpetually reproducing, including 
condom distribution and education and the implementation of the Standard Days Method, 
a system in which Rwanda women and their partner are able to keep track of her fertile 
window using CycleBeads, a hand-held system of beads and rings. According to Blair, 
Sinai, Mukabatsinda & Muramutsa (2007): 
The woman or her partner move a black ring along their CycleBeads daily, 
one bead each day. The position of the ring . . .  conveys whether the woman 
is in her fertile window (days 8-19 of the cycle). When the band is on a 
white bead (representing a fertile day) the couple avoids unprotected 
intercourse to prevent pregnancy. They can use a barrier method or abstain 
from intercourse on these days . . .  the majority of respondents, male and 
female, found that CycleBeads were easy to use and interpret. (64) 
The instruction and discussion regarding family planning education initiatives takes 
place in the communal meetings following umuganda, since it is regarded as the primary 
time in which to speak to the whole community (national and local) regarding additional 
projects of development. Other methods of communication, namely the media, are 
intensely regulated by the current Rwandan administration given the role of independent 
radio and newspapers in inciting the genocide. In essence, umuganda serves multiple 
ends; there are the tangible products that result from physical labor (infrastructure) and 
there are the intangible products that are the result of using umuganda as a means for the 
government to share information with all of the public. It can be determined that the state 
is benefiting from umuganda, though scholarship is divided on the positive impact for the 
citizenry. 
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According the Rwandan government, umuganda has been successfully incorporated 
into the Rwandan development scheme; in order to stimulate the economy and create 
sustainable (in)tangible infrastructure, umuganda is considered essential. President 
Kagame (2011) commented: 
The way to avoid dependency and indignity is for Rwandans to value 
work, to work together, as is the practice with umuganda, and to do the 
right thing, including planting trees, productive agriculture, building 
schools for Rwandan children, subscribing to community health 
insurance . . .  and to promote commerce and business in order to generate 
wealth. (The New Times) 
The direct impact of umuganda's role in Rwandan political development remains to be 
clear. Fisley (1998) states, "the idea that social hatreds and inclusions arise and fall 
historically in conditions where political power is consolidated and deployed," therefore 
inclusion in "Rwanda civil society rests ... on political will" (p. 17). The "political will" 
can come in the form of public participation in the democratic system or it could be the 
implementation of a development dictatorship. 
There is an increase in research suggesting "semi-democracies are most likely to 
erupt into violence - certainly more likely than both authoritarian regimes and 
established democracies"15 (Uvin, 2001, 93). The current state of Rwanda's political 
climate is seemingly stable, though poverty, unemployment, and its sizable population 
make Rwanda susceptible to these possible "eruptions" that Uvin speaks of. It can be 
15 Uvin (200 1 )  also suggests that the Rwandan genocide was a product of international pressure to 
democratize under the auspices of SAPs in the late 1 980s and early 1 990s. 
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argued that, in theory, umuganda plays an integral role in creating participation and 
inclusion in a democratic state. Ideally, umuganda would provide an avenue in which 
members of the local community, under the guise of the national one, collectively discuss 
the state of their union. This collaboration would serve as an integral foundation for the 
democratic system at the grassroots level; citizens would be involved in the decision­
making progress choosing umuganda projects that are specific to their community needs. 
Research into the impact of umuganda in the democratic process is minimal, though one 
field study regarding the Rwandan inter-organizational development network suggests 
that umuganda is not serving the needs of the peasants, and in fact, structurally resembles 
the umuganda of previous administrations. Although, "umuganda projects are often 
generated by residents' demands/feedback," typically "project-related umuganda 
activities seemingly flow from the top-down, as national leaders set development targets 
that trickle down to umudugudu [community]" (Ryan, 2010, pp. 21-22). Projects are 
chosen by bureaucratic officials who attempt to balance the available resources and goals 
of President Kagame's development plans with local demand. Ryan (2010) suggests 
"that peasants have limited input into the selection of umuganda projects" yet it serves as 
"a source of inspiration for young leaders, including many college students" (pp. 23-24). 
The extent to which umuganda is truly serving the needs of the peasants while also 
providing democratic inclusion in increasing economic development requires further 
research. 
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Concluding Remarks 
On one hand, umuganda is no more than a system in which to exploit peasant labor 
and highlight the frustrations of the young men who were the "most vulnerable to the 
kind of ethnic appeals that led to genocide" in the first place (Uvin, 1998, p. 137). Yet, in 
comparison, it is a "tradition that served as a driving force for positive change . . .  based on 
the idea that every individual must contribute to and feel responsible for the community's 
well being" (Agbor, 2011). President Kagame recognizes how some Rwandans do not 
feel that umuganda is serving their direct interests noting: 
I have yet to understand this - all our children are in school, we care for 
the health of all Rwandans and are working for their welfare, for food 
security, good nutrition; providing access to new technology, including 
computers for our school children so they can communicate with 
whomever they want and Rwandans can access all the information they 
want; Rwandans choose the leaders they want to work with; we do 
everything to promote citizens' development. But after listing all this, the 
conclusion of some is that Rwandans don't have space to express 
themselves. (The New Times, 2011) 
Regardless, the role umuganda plays in Rwandan economic and political development is 
deliberate and indicative of how integral the peasantry is to rebuilding efforts. Rwandans 
are collectively cooperating in the physical labor of constructing their nation by utilizing 
the same ritual that laid the foundation for mass participation in the genocide. 
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Glossary of Kinyarwanda Terms 
akazu - small house, hut 
ganwa - royal , elite social class 
Imana - God 
Appendix 
interahamwe - those who attack together 
Interahamwe - Hutu youth militia that was perpetrator in 1994 genocide 
inyenzi - cockroach 
kwihutura - to cease being a Hutu , by gaining wealth in pre-colonial Rwanda 
mwami - king 
rutsindamapfa - royal granary 
ubuhake - traditional contract of cattle loaning 
ubureetwa - traditional feudal land distribution system based on labor 
umuheto - bow; military service 
umudugudu - collection of homes , the smallest administrative grouping 
umuganda - communal work, national service 
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